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Coordination among countries of their monetary and 
budget policies has been proposed recently as a way to 
improve the current system of floating exchange rates. 
This proposal has been prompted by the apparent failure 
of the floating rate system to eliminate policy interdepen-
dence, the effects of one country's policies on other 
countries' economies. Although the floating rate system 
has seemed to allow countries greater freedom in their 
choice of monetary and budget policies, in the last few 
years many countries have complained about being hurt 
by other countries' policies—especially those of the 
United States. Our study suggests that, because of policy 
interdependence, some form of international coordina-
tion of macroeconomic policies would, indeed, improve 
the floating exchange rate system. 
This conclusion—that countries would in some sense 
be better off if they choose macro policies jointly than if 
they choose those policies independently—is implied by a 
simple model of a world economy. The ingredients of the 
model that are crucial for the conclusion are its assump-
tions about currency and debt markets and about a 
country's well-being: 
• Currencies of different countries are not direct sub-
stitutes; each country's currency ends up being held 
only by its own residents. 
• The interest-bearing debt of any one government 
trades in an integrated world credit market where it 
competes with debt issued by other governments and 
by private residents of all countries. 
• Government borrowing affects the world interest 
rate. (Residents of a country don't match changes in 
their government's borrowing with offsetting changes 
in their own borrowing, partly because they don't 
expect the government's outstanding debt to be 
retired in their lifetime.) 
•A country's well-being depends on both the world 
real interest rate and its own price level because 
some of its residents borrow at the world rate and 
some hold wealth in the form of the country's 
currency. 
We think these assumptions are good approximations of 
conditions in the actual world economy. Moreover, they 
are present, at least implicitly, in many models. This 
study is the first, however, to systematically analyze the 
implications of these assumptions for the issue of inter-
national coordination of macroeconomic policies.
1 
A Preview of the Study 
Before presenting the formal description and analysis of 
our model, we describe briefly and informally the model, 
its defense, and its implications for policy coordination. 
The Model 
The model is designed to make qualitative predictions 
about the economic outcomes across countries of alterna-
1 Coordination of macroeconomic policies has been studied before, but using 
models with very different basic ingredients. See Cooper 1985 for a survey of 
previous research. 
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tive national monetary and budget policies. The out-
comes are equilibrium sequences of price levels, interest 
rates, and lifetime consumption patterns for the residents 
of different countries. The demands and supplies that 
appear explicitly in the model are those for bonds, or 
securities—all of which are traded in one world market— 
and for base monies, or currencies, one for each country. 
The equilibrium sequences are those which equate 
demands and supplies of bonds and base monies at each 
date. 
The model has only one good per date and, aside from 
consumption of that good, only one economic activity: 
borrowing and lending. We assume that each of several 
countries is populated by an infinite sequence of identical 
overlapping generations whose members live two periods. 
Each generation in each country consists of two groups on 
opposite sides of the credit market: borrowers and savers. 
The private supplies and demands for bonds and monies 
are derived from the behavior of these groups. The 
borrowers supply private bonds. The savers, besides 
demanding bonds, demand the base money of their 
country because they have to; a reserve requirement 
forces them to hold some fraction of their savings as 
domestic currency. This restriction ensures that each 
country's base money is held even when other currencies 
and securities bear higher returns; it also produces the 
model's separate currency markets. At the first date of the 
model, the people in each country who are in the second 
period of their lives own the initial outstanding stock of 
their country's monetary base. 
The private demands and supplies depend on agents' 
price expectations, which are assumed to be rational 
The model has no uncertainty, so this means the expected 
prices coincide with those that actually prevail. 
Each government determines additions to the supply 
of its bonds and money by its choice of budget and 
monetary policies. Budget policy is made by choosing the 
path over time of the real deficit net-of-interest: the real 
value of the government's budget deficit, excluding from 
government expenditures any interest payments or re-
ceipts. (Throughout, we hold real taxes constant, so that 
a change in budget policy corresponds to a change in real 
government consumption.) Monetary policy is made by 
choosing the division of government debt over time 
between bonds and money. Governments do not buy and 
sell each other's currencies; in this sense, exchange rates 
float. 
Primarily in order to keep the analysis simple, we 
consider only budget policies for which the deficit net-of-
interest is constant over time and only monetary policies 
for which the ratio of bonds to base money is constant 
over time. For these policies, there is an equilibrium 
which takes a simple form. It has a constant world real 
interest rate and constant country-specific inflation rates. 
These imply that the situation of different generations in 
each country is constant over time. 
A Defense of the Model 
We defend our model in two ways: by showing that it is 
internally consistent and by showing that its implications 
are broadly consistent with recent events. 
We show that the model is internally consistent by 
building it from a theory of individual behavior and 
proving that under reasonable conditions an equilibrium 
exists for given policies. The equilibrium assures us that 
the actions of individual agents are mutually consistent 
and lead to the aggregate outcomes our model implies. 
We show that the model's implications are broadly 
consistent with recent events by comparing actual eco-
nomic experience to the model's predictions for the 
qualitative effects of a change in monetary and budget 
policies like that implemented recently by the United 
States and other countries. 
For this purpose, we describe the model's implications 
for the adoption in one country of a permanently easier 
budget policy together with a nonaccommodating mone-
tary policy, with other countries remaining passive. 
Specifically, we assume that one country permanently 
increases its government's real budget deficit net-of-
interest and accompanies that with an increase in the ratio 
of government bonds to base money which keeps un-
affected the quantity of base money at the date of the 
policy change. Passiveness by other countries means that 
they do not respond with changes in their budget policies 
(their real government purchases and taxes) or their 
monetary policies (their ratios of government bonds to 
base money). 
When we compare the model's predictions for this set 
of policies with actual events, we identify the active 
country with the United States, the period of the model 
with four years, and the first period with the four years 
beginning in 1981. Our representation of policy, at least 
for the active country, seems to be a reasonable descrip-
tion of what has actually occurred in the United States 
beginning in 1981. In the four years since then, the U.S. 
net-of-interest budget deficit rose from its previous aver-
age of nearly zero to an average of 2 percent of gross 
national product, and the ratio of U.S. government bonds 
to base money rose, roughly, from 4 to 6. 
The model's predictions for the direction that various 
economic variables change in response to such policy 
changes are shown in Table 1. These predictions roughly 
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The International Effects 
of Easing a Country's Budget Policy 










Real Interest Rate  +  + + 
Inflation Rate  +  + 
Nominal Interest Rate  +  + + 
Initial Price Level  0  + 
Initial Value of Currency 
Relative to Active Country's  n.a.  + 
Initial Current Account Deficit  +  + or-
+ = increases 





match recent experience. Since 1981, we have seen 
higher real interest rates, an enhanced value of the U.S. 
dollar relative to the currencies of debtor governments, 
and a higher U.S. current account deficit. (The higher 
inflation rate prediction for the United States is a 
prediction of the future course of the price level which 
assumes no subsequent change in the real deficit net-of-
interest or in the ratio of bonds to money.) 
Implications for Policy Coordination 
For some purposes, policymakers might want more than 
qualitative predictions or descriptions of the effects of 
given policies. They might want to know what policies 
other countries would adopt in various circumstances. A 
country contemplating a change in policy surely would 
want to know if and how other countries would respond. It 
could also want to know whether it could end up in a 
better position if it joined with other countries to choose 
monetary and budget policies than if they all proceeded, 
in some sense, independently. A standard mathematical 
theory, called game theory, deals with such questions. 
We apply that theory to the choice of monetary policy in 
our model. 
To apply it, we need to add to the model assumptions 
about the objectives or goals pursued by countries. We 
assume that countries try to do the best they can for their 
residents. In our model, this is complicated by the fact 
that each country is populated by groups of people whose 
interests do not coincide. 
In an equilibrium with a constant real interest rate and 
constant inflation rates, each country is populated by 
three well-defined groups. There is a group of people who, 
at the date of the policy choice, own assets denominated 
in domestic currency and are thus better off the lower the 
starting price level. There is another group, the current 
and future savers, whose savings earn a return which is a 
weighted average (determined by the reserve require-
ment) of the real return on the country's monetary base 
and that on securities. These people are better off the 
higher is this average real return. Finally, there is the 
group of current and future borrowers who borrow at the 
real return on securities and who, therefore, are better off 
the lower is that real return. This correspondence between 
predicted paths for price levels and the interest rate and 
the well-being of these different groups implies conflicts of 
interest—for example, between a country's borrowers, 
who prefer an easier monetary policy, and the initial 
owners of its monetary base, who prefer a tighter 
monetary policy. 
An objective for a country must weight these compet-
ing interests. The objective we adopt, maximization of a 
social welfare function, assumes this is done. The social 
welfare function of a country describes how the govern-
ment trades off the well-being of its three different groups 
as it makes policy decisions. 
Using a social welfare function for each country, we 
compare what happens if each country chooses a mone-
tary policy that maximizes that function taking as given 
the choices of the monetary policies of other countries— 
our way of describing noncooperation—with what hap-
pens if countries choose their monetary policies jointly, 
or cooperatively. We find, for the special case of iden-
tical countries, that every country can do better if all 
countries cooperate than if they do not. This doing better, 
of course, is in terms of the country's social welfare 
function. Every person in each country is not better off 
under cooperation. Rather, given the way social welfare 
functions (the governments) weight the different groups in 
each country, cooperation results in a higher value of each 
social welfare function, but at the expense of at least one 
group in each country. 
Although we demonstrate a gain from cooperation 
only in a very special model, the result is likely to hold in 
any model which shares these crucial features of ours: 
separate country-by-country markets in currencies and 
an integrated world credit market in which government 
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borrowing affects the world interest rate. These features 
produce policy interdependence: one country's policy 
affects others through the effects of its borrowing on the 
world real interest rate. The features also produce a kind 
of asymmetry: a country's choice of monetary policy 
affects its borrowers and borrowers in other countries in 
the same way, but affects the initial owners of currency 
and savers in its country differently than those in other 
countries. This asymmetry is what produces the gain from 
cooperation. 
The Model 
Our model is a multi-country version of the single-country 
model used in Wallace 1984. Here we describe the model 
and study the equilibrium for a special case in which the 
saving behavior of individuals in each country takes a 
particularly simple form.
2 
A Typical Country 
Each country in our model has a private sector and a 
public sector. 
• Private Demands and Supplies 
Each country k (for k = 1,2,..., K) is populated by over-
lapping generations, the members of which live two 
periods. At each date t (where Ms an integer) a new 
generation, generation t, appears. Its members are pres-
ent in the economy at t (when they are young) and at t + 1 
(when they are old). We assume that people do not move 
between countries, a standard assumption in models of 
international trade. 
The model contains one good at each date, the time t 
good, that is common to all countries.
3 This good can be 
costlessly and instantly transported from one country to 
another. There is, however, no production; the time t good 
cannot be produced or used to produce any other good 
(that is, any good available at any other time than t). 
Each member of generation t has preferences over 
private consumption of the time t and time t+ 1 goods, 
preferences that are representable by a utility function or 
an indifference curve map of the usual sort. These 
preferences are unaffected by government consumption. 
Each such member also has an income stream or endow-
ment consisting of some amount of the time t good and 
some amount of the time t + 1 good. 
We assume that different generations are identical and 
that within each country each generation has a special 
kind of diversity. Each generation consists of two groups 
of people. Members of one group, called lenders (or 
savers), are identical and have preferences and endow-
ments that lead them to want to lend (or save) at most 
rates of return. Members of the other group, called 
borrowers (or dissavers), are also identical and have pref-
erences and endowments that lead them to want to 
borrow (or dissave) at most rates of return. 
These assumptions imply that the competitive desired 
trades by the members of each group in country k can be 
described as functions of the terms of trade between the 
time t good and the time t + 1 good faced by the members 
of each group. We let Sk( •) denote the aggregate supply 
function or curve of the time t good (or desired lending or 
saving) of the lender group of generation t in country k and 
let D
k( •) denote the aggregate demand curve for the time t 
good (or desired borrowing or dissaving) of the borrower 
group for generation t in country k. In each case, the argu-
ment of the function is the intertemporal terms of trade 
which we express by the price of the time t good in units of 
the time t + 1 good (the gross real rate of return) faced by 
the members of the respective group. In general, as we 
will see, lenders, who are subject to a reserve require-
ment, face a different and lower rate of return than 
borrowers. We assume that D
k( •) is decreasing where it 
is positive.
4 
Since we will be describing how this economy evolves 
over time from the initial (or current) date, which we label 
t = 1, we need to add to the above description of the 
competitive behavior of the young of each generation in 
country k a description of the behavior of the country's 
people who are in the second period of their lives at t = 1, 
the initial (or current) old. We assume that their pref-
erences are such that they try to consume as much of the 
time 1 good as they can and that they are endowed, or 
start, with some of the time 1 good and some nominally 
denominated assets (assets valued in terms of the current 
price level). Their implied competitive behavior is very 
simple: they supply all their assets at any positive price in 
terms of the time 1 good. 
These assumptions imply some simple relationships 
between prices, including rates of return, and the well-
being of individuals in country k: the initial old are better 
off the more valuable are their nominally denominated 
assets at time 1; lenders, or savers, in any generation t (for 
t > 1) are better off the higher the rate of return they earn 
on savings; borrowers in any generation t (for t > 1) are 
2The special case should make our presentation accessible to undergraduate 
students of economics—at least those whose background includes intermediate 
microeconomic theory and some calculus. 
3Under well-known conditions, the single time t good can be interpreted as a 
composite good. See, for example, Kareken and Wallace 1981, p. 210. 
4If the arguments of borrowers' utility functions are normal goods, thenD^( •) 
is decreasing where it is positive. For a more detailed description of the derivation 
of the S
k{ •) and D
k{ •) functions, see Wallace 1984, pp. 16-18, or the section on 
the derivation of demand in any intermediate price theory text. 
17 better off the lower the rate of return at which they can 
borrow. It is in terms of these relationships that we will 
describe how one country's policy affects other countries 
and how cooperation can or cannot improve welfare. 
• Government Policy 
Each country in the model has a budget policy and a 
monetary policy. Budget policy is a sequence of the real 
net-of-interest deficit (the difference between real govern-
ment consumption and real taxes, the latter of which we 
hold fixed throughout). Monetary policy is sequences of 
the monetary base and the interest-bearing government 
debt which finance the deficit. Consistent with this, we 
write the cash flow constraint of country k's combined 
budget and monetary authority as 






which must hold for all dates t > 1. Here G
k, measured in 
units of the time t good, is government k's real deficit net-
of-interest. The first term on the right side of equation (1) 
is the value in terms of the time t good of government k
9s 
addition to its outstanding monetary base, and the second 
term is the value of its addition to its outstanding debt, 
which consists of one-period, zero coupon (pure discount) 
bonds. Specifically, the variables on the right side of 
equation (1) are defined this way: 
H
k — The country k monetary base that generation 
t — 1 starts with at time t. 
p
k = The time t price of a unit of the country k 
monetary base in units of the time t consump-
tion good (1 //>? = the country k price level at 
time t). 
B
k = The nominal face value, in terms of the country 
k monetary base, of the maturing country k 
government bonds owned by members of gen-
eration t — 1 at time t. 
P
kt = The price at time t, in terms of the country k 
monetary base, of a bond that pays one unit 
of the country k monetary base at time t + 1. 
[The country k nominal interest rate at t is 
(1 /Pf) ~ 1.] 
To insure that the monetary base of country k has 
value in equilibrium and that its bonds can bear nomi-
nal interest in equilibrium (P
k < 1), we assume that 
country k imposes (and is able to costlessly enforce) a 
reserve requirement on its residents' saving. Any resi-
dent of country k that saves a positive amount must 
hold a fraction \
k of that amount in the form of country 
k base money. This requirement implies that the gross 
real rate of return faced by country k lenders at time t is 
the following weighted average: 7*= \
kR
k
 + (1— \
k)rt, 
where R
kis the gross real rate of return on the country k 
monetary base, namely, p
kt+x/p
kt, and rt is the gross real 
rate of return on loans, the single real return on loans in 
all countries. 
As discussed more fully in Wallace 1984 (p. 19), 
this reserve requirement is intended to capture in a 
simple way the role played by legal restrictions on 
private borrowing and lending in actual economies. 
Taken literally, it is an accurate description of an 
economy in which all individual lending, or saving, by 
residents of a country must take the form of accounts at 
banks or financial intermediaries, and these institutions 
must hold some fraction of the amount in those ac-
counts in the form of the country's base money, but can 
otherwise hold assets in any form they want. If these 
institutions operate competitively and costlessly, then 
the rate they pay on their liabilities (their deposits) is a 
weighted average of the rate they earn on reserves and 
the rate they earn on loans, the weighted average de-
scribed above as that facing private lenders. 
World Equilibrium 
Before formally describing the conditions for equilib-
rium in our world of K countries, we must describe 
some conditions on prices and interest rates, arbitrage 
conditions, that are implicit in the above description of 
individual trading opportunities. The first involves arbi-
trage between goods and monies, and the second in-
volves arbitrage among securities. 
As noted above, we are assuming that the single 
good in our world economy can be costlessly trans-
ported between countries. The first arbitrage condi-
tion—commonly known as purchasing power parity— 
is that the prices of the monies of any two countries in 
terms of the good and the exchange rate between the 
two monies are such that no gains can be made from 
the following set of transactions: selling the good in 
country Ic, using the resulting country k money to buy 
country k' money, and using the country k' money to 
buy the good in country k\ As the reader can verify, 
the condition that no gain be possible from such trans-
actions is that the exchange rate e
k'
k\
 the price of coun-
try k money in units of country k' money at date t, be 







The second arbitrage condition is that interest rates 
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facing borrowers in the K countries of our world econ-
omy are such that they imply the same terms of trade at 
any date t between the time t good and the time t + 1 
good. This condition is implied by the assumption that 
anyone in any country can borrow and lend in any 
other country subject only to the reserve requirement on 
positive saving. Under this assumption, we cannot have 
an equilibrium in which the real return on loans in one 
country exceeds that in another country because in such 
a situation no saver would want to hold securities bear-
ing the lower return (a demand consistent with reserve 
requirements) and every borrower would want to 
borrow at the lower rate. Together, these imply an 
excess supply of the securities bearing the lower return 
and an excess demand for those bearing the higher 
return, which, of course, cannot be an equilibrium. 
Thus, the assumption that individuals and governments 
can borrow and lend anywhere subject only to the 
reserve requirement implies that our world economy 
has only one real rate of return on loans. In the notation 
introduced above, it implies a single real rate of return 
on loans, rt. 
For prices, including interest rates and exchange 
rates, that satisfy these two arbitrage conditions, the 
real trading opportunities facing individuals are those 
we have described—essentially, trading present con-
sumption for future consumption or, equivalently, trad-
ing present consumption for assets which are promises 
of fUture consumption. 
Now we can describe what we mean by a competi-
tive, perfect foresight equilibrium for this world econ-
omy. Competitive means that people treat prices as 
beyond their control when they choose quantities. 
Perfect foresight here means that anticipated rates of 
return on assets equal actual or realized rates of return 
or, more particularly, that at each date t the young 
correctly anticipate the price of the monies of the dif-
ferent countries in terms of goods at the next date. 
Equilibrium means that all markets clear at each date. 
From now on, we will refer to a competitive, perfect 
foresight equilibrium as simply an equilibrium. 
The formal definition of equilibrium that we give 
below is valid only for values of rt for which the bor-
rowers of each country actually borrow or, more pre-
cisely, only for values of rt for which D
k(rt) > 0 for 
every k. The following notation allows us to state this 
condition concisely. Let r
k be such that D^r*) = 0, and 
let r be the smallest of the r
k for k = 1,2,..., K. Then 
D
k(r) > 0 for all k if r < r. This condition appears as 
part of the following definition of an equilibrium: 
DEFINITION. Given each country's reserve requirement 
\
k, its initial nominal indebtedness including its base 
money H\ + B\(a total which is assumed positive), se-
quences for its real net-of-interest deficit G
kf and a se-
quence for its base money an equilibrium consists 
of a sequence for rt satisfying rt < r and sequences 





that for all t > 1 satisfy equation (1), the cash flow 
constraint for each country, and 
(3) 2 - D\r)] = ZM^i + «h)] 





















where for each country k (4)-(8) must hold and either 
(7) or (8) must hold at equality. 
Equation (3) says that world net private saving—the 
sum over countries of each country's saving supplied at 
the weighted average of the return on its base money 
and the return on securities less each country's private 
borrowing—must equal the total world value of govern-
ment liabilities. Equations (4), (5), and (6) define the 
returns facing savers and borrowers in each country and 
contain our perfect foresight assumption—namely, that 
the returns that determine choices at t match the actual 
returns. Note that (6) implies that the ratio of a country's 
gross inflation rate, p
kJp
k+i,
 to its gross nominal interest 
rate, l/P
kf is the same for all countries. Inequalities (7) 
and (8) and the accompanying proviso are related to the 
reserve requirement. Inequality (7) says that the return 
on loans is at least as great as that on the base money of 
each country. If it were not, then unlimited gains could 
be made by borrowing and using the proceeds to ac-
quire base money, activities which would not violate the 
reserve requirement. That being so, no equilibrium can 
violate (7). Inequality (8) expresses the reserve require-
ment: the value of country k base money must be at 
least as great as the required fraction X
k times gross 
saving of the residents of country k. The proviso arises 
in this way. If rt > R
kf then wealth maximization im-
plies that country k residents and everyone else hold no 
more of country k base money than the minimum re-
19 quired, which is to say that (8) holds at equality. Alter-
natively, if the value of country k
9s base money exceeds 
the minimum required to be held \p
kH
kt+l
 > X*S*(r})], 
then wealth maximization implies that the return on 
country k base money is as great as the return on 
securities, which is (7) at equality.
5 
Instead of trying to study all possible equilibria for 
this economy for arbitrary sequences of government 
policies, we study a limited class of policies and poten-
tial equilibria under those policies. We study only poli-
cies for which each country's real net-of-interest deficit 
is a constant, G
k= G
k, and each country's ratio of gov-




k. For such policies, we attempt to describe only 
those equilibria for which all real variables are con-
stant over time, equilibria we call stationary equilib-
ria. For such policies, we formally define a stationary 
equilibrium as follows: 
DEFINITION. Given \
k, H\+ B\> 0, G
k, and p
k for 
each k, a stationary equilibrium consists of a scalar 




k, and p\ for each k, 
where h





k denotes a constant real 















(11)  r* = X












where either (12) or (13) must hold at equality. 
Note that equation (9) is the stationary version of the 
country k cash flow constraint, equation (1), and that 
(14) comes from that constraint for the first date, t=\. 
For constant real sequences, this definition of an equi-
librium and the earlier one are equivalent. 
Below we make assumptions that imply that station-
ary equilibria are necessarily binding, equilibria for 
which (13) holds at equality. We focus on binding 
stationary equilibria because we suspect that they are 
the relevant ones for the current world economy.
6 Our 
approach to studying binding stationary equilibria is to 
solve equations (9)—(11) and equation (13) at equality 
for the h
k, b
k, and rates of return and then to verify that 
the implied solution satisfies (12). If it does and if it 
implies a positive p\ using equation (14), then it is a 
valid solution. 
If equilibria are binding, we can reduce equations 
(9)—(11) and (13) at equality, 3K + \ equations, to 
K + 1 equations in K + 1 unknowns, r and the R
k. 
From the definitions of h
k and b







Since, by (5) and (6), P
k= R
k/rt, a constant in a station-






Then, upon substituting the right sides of (16) and (13) 
at equality into (9) and (10) we have, respectively, 
(17) G






If we use (11) to replace r* by the weighted average of R
k 
and rt then the resulting versions of equations (17) and 
(18) are the K + 1 equations in the ^T + 1 unknowns, r 
andi?* for each k, that we referred to above. Moreover, as 
noted above, if the solution for these K + 1 equations 
satisfies (12) and is such that (14) can be solved for a 
positive p\ for each k, then the solution is a valid binding 
equilibrium. 
A Special Case 
Since (17) and (18) are complicated equations for general 
functions S
k( •) and D
k( •), we will study in detail only a 
special case of the model, one in which each S
k{ •) func-
tion is a constant, denoted S
k, which does not depend on 
the return, r*
7 This case is easy to study because for it, as 
we now show, equations (17) and (18) can be rewritten as 
a set of completely recursive equations, equations which 
5 Two conditions in this definition depend on the restriction rt < r. Without it, 
the argument ofD^ (•) in (3) is not necessarily rt and the right side of (8) would have 
to be \
k S*(/j) + A* max [0, ~Dk(rft]. 
6One significant feature of nonbinding equilibria is perfect substitution among 
the monetary bases of the different countries. See Kareken and Wallace 1981 for a 
discussion of the consequences of such substitution. 
7lf lenders have a utility function of the Cobb-Douglas form and if their 
endowment is entirely in the form of income when they are young, then S
k( •) is a 
constant fraction of that income (and does not depend on any rate of return). 
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can be solved one at a time. 










Solving (17) in this way is valid if r(l+/?*) - p
k T* 0. 
Below we present conditions that insure that the implied 
solution for r is such that this holds. Then, if we substitute 
the right side of (19) into the right side of (18) and at the 
same time impose the constant saving assumption, we can 
write the result as 
















and where p = (P\ p\..., p
K) and G = (G\ G\..., G*). 
Note that E(r), an increasing function of r, is the 
world private excess demand for securities if the reserve 
requirement is binding in every country. The function 
F(r; p,G) can be interpreted as the supply of securities by 
all the governments, a supply implied by the stationary 
versions of their cash flow constraints, bindingness of all 
the reserve requirements, and the choices of government 
portfolios, the p
k. If equation (20), which contains only 
one unknown, r, can be solved, then its solution can be 
used in equation (19) to find R
k. It can also be used to find 
p










Equation (21) is obtained from (14)—with H
k + B
k = 
1—by substituting for h
k and b
k from (13) and (16) at 
equality and for R
k/r from (19).
8 
The propositions we want to establish, mainly about 






k > 0 and p




 1)] < 0. 





ASSUMPTION 4. rD'(r)/D(r) < —1, 
where D(r) = XJ)
k(r). 
The first part of Assumption 1 places bounds on the 
net-of-interest deficit; the upper bound is such that the 
deficit can be financed with p
k = 0; the lower bound says 
that, net of interest, the budget is not in surplus. The 
second part of Assumption 1 limits ratios of government 
debt to base money to those that keep the sum of the 
monetary base and the face value of government debt 
positive. Assumption 2 says that net private saving is 
negative at r < 1, that is, at negative and zero real interest 
rates. Together, these two assumptions have the following 
consequence: 
PROPOSITION 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, any 
stationary equilibrium has r > 1 and is a binding 
equilibrium. 
(Proofs of Propositions 1-3 appear in Appendix A.) 
Assumption 3 assures that we get a binding equilib-
rium with r < r. It assures that no matter how large are the 
p
k—that is, no matter how tight monetary policies are— 
there is an equilibrium with r<r.
9 Note that if countries 
are identical, so that, among other things, D\r) = 0 for all 
k, then Assumption 3 is implied by the simple condition 
1 - X > X/(r—\). 
PROPOSITION 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, a binding 
equilibrium with r < r exists. 
Proposition 2 leaves open the possibility that there are 
several solutions to equation (20) and, hence, several 
binding equilibria with r < r. The next proposition shows 
that the elasticity condition, Assumption 4, rules out this 
possibility. 
PROPOSITION 3. Under Assumptions 1-3 and either 
Assumption 4 or the existence of an equilibrium 
with F(r; p, G) > 0, equation (20) has a unique 
solution with r < r. 
The arguments in the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 (in 
Appendix A) imply that the functionsE(r) andF(r; p,G) 
are essentially as shown in Figures 1 and 2. That is, 
F(r; p, G) crosses E(r) only once and from above on the 
left. Thus, under the assumptions of Proposition 3, we can 
define the unique value of r < r that satisfies (20) as a 
function of p and G, say, 
(22) r=0(/5,G). 
8 Setting 1 for all k saves space and is innocuous. It amounts to no 
more than choosing monetary units of the different countries in a particular way. 
^Examples of economies with r as large as we want are easy to produce. For 
example, if every borrower in every country has a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
which weights consumption when young and when old equally and has the same 
lifetime income pattern, say, h^ when young and when old, then r = vv^/vv^. 
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Possible Real Interest Rate Solutions to Equation (20) 
Figure 1 If All p's Positive Figure 2 If All p's Negative 
By direct substitutions into (19) and (21), we get the 
corresponding unique solutions for R
k andp\. Then, given 
the solutions for p\, we use (2) to solve for e\
k'. 
The Effects of a Policy Change: 
The Model's Predictions vs. Recent Events 
Existence of equilibria under given policies in our model 
indicates a kind of internal consistency. Now we want to 
describe a kind of external consistency as well—to show, 
that is, that the model's predictions for policies like those 
adopted in the world in the last few years roughly agree 
with what has in fact occurred. We adopt the assumptions 
of Proposition 3 and generate the model's qualitative 
predictions by determining how the unique world equilib-
rium changes when one nation's budget and monetary 
policies change. 
We characterize the policies actually adopted in 
recent years as the adoption of a more expansionary 
budget policy in the face of a nonaccommodating mone-
tary policy in the United States coupled with a passive 
policy response in the rest of the world. Labeling the 
United States country 1, we represent the adoption of a 
more expansionary budget policy as a permanent in-
crease in the U. S. budget deficit net-of-interest G
l. Given 
this change in budget policy, we represent a nonaccom-
modating U.S. monetary policy as a permanent change in 
p
l which keeps the monetary base in the period of the 




 We represent the passive policy response in the 
rest of the world as no change in the rest of the model's G's 
and j3's. 
In order to make the qualitative predictions of our 
combined budget and monetary policy experiment better 
understood, we first describe the model's predictions for 
each policy change alone. This exercise also shows that 
our model cannot explain recent events by a change in just 
U.S. budget policy, but instead gives monetary policy a 
prominent role. 
The structure of the model and the solutions indicate 
that all effects on other countries of a change in country 
l's budget and monetary policies result from a change in 
the real interest rate.
1
1
 Because of this, we solve once for 
the effects of a change in the real interest rate on the infla-
tion rate, the nominal interest rate, the price level, and the 
current account deficit of a passive country—one whose 
G and p are fixed. Then, to determine the effects of a 
change in country 1 's policies on other countries, we need 
only use equation (20) to determine how that change 
affects the real interest rate. 
The analysis continues with an examination of own-
lONote that the United States cannot adhere to the original path of H
l for all 
time. This is not a stationary policy, because it requires in each period an increase 
in /3
1 and, hence, an increase in r. In a finite number of periods such a policy would 
cause the interest payments on the debt to exceed potential tax revenue. 
11 In terms of Figures 1 and 2, we determine how changes in p and G shift the 
curve F(r; G) and, hence, move the intersection of E(r) and F(r; p, G). 
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country effects of policy changes. These effects are 
generally different from the cross-country effects because 
of some direct effects on the government's budget in 
addition to the interest rate change. Then, given the own-
country and cross-country effects, we calculate the 
change in the own-country's exchange rate—the value of 
its currency relative to other countries'—and the change 
in its balance on current account. 
In our calculation of a country's current account 
balance, we assume that all foreign debt contracted at 
time t— 1 by individuals of generation / — 1 is paid off at 
time t at the gross real interest rate rt_x. Thus, at time t, the 
real value of total foreign claims on country k, K
k is the 
excess of total domestic borrowing at time t—by indi-
vidual residents and the government, D




 respectively—over total domestic saving, S
k: 
(23) K






The current account deficit, C
k measures the increase 
over time in real foreign claims on country k, which can 








k + p*(H*+B*) ~ S
k~ K
k_{. 
Two points can be made from (24) about a country's 
real current account deficit. First, in a stationary equilib-
rium, A'fmust be constant for t > 1, so that the current 
account deficit must be zero for t > 2. However, since K\ 
can be different from KQ, C\ can be different from zero. 
Second, by substituting for terms on the right side of (24), 
we see that the current account deficit measures the 
excess of consumption in country k—by the old, the 
young borrowers, the young lenders, and the govern-
ment—over total endowments (the country k trade 
deficit) plus net interest payments on foreign debt 
(rt_x—\)K
k_x. We assume in our policy experiments that 
(r0-l)K
k is unaffected by the choice of policy at time 1. 
The effects of a change in the real interest rate on a 
passive country's inflation rate, nominal interest rate, 
price level, and current account deficit are calculated by 
differentiating equations (19), (21), and (24) holding its 
policies G and p fixed. In these calculations we assume 
Assumptions 1-4 hold. (The derivatives are displayed in 
Appendix B, and the effects of an increase in the real 
interest rate are displayed in Table 2.) 
The results in Table 2 are best understood in terms of 
the impact of a higher real interest rate on a passive 
government's budget. If the government is a debtor, then a 
higher real interest rate raises its interest payments and 
forces it to increase the rate at which it is issuing both 
money and debt. If it is a creditor, then the reverse occurs. 
The model's qualitative predictions for the effects of a 
policy change in country 1 are determined in two steps. 
First we obtain general expressions for the changes in the 
real interest rate and the own-country inflation rate, 
nominal interest rate, price level, current account deficit, 
and exchange rates by differentiating equations (20), 
(19), (21), (24), and (2). (These derivatives are also 
displayed in Appendix B.) In the second step, we identify 
country 1 as the United States and, in addition to 
Assumptions 1-4, we make two assumptions. We 
assume, quite realistically, that the U.S. government is a 
debtor, so that /3
1 > 0, and that the governments of all 










 > 0 
by Assumption 1. The discussion that follows invokes 
these additional assumptions. 
Tighter U.S. Monetary Policy 
The first policy we evaluate is a tighter monetary policy in 
country 1, which we have identified as the United States. 
We increase jS
1, the ratio of government bonds to money 
in the United States, holding all other /?'s and all G's 
constant. The predictions from our model are combined 
Table 2 
The Effects of a Higher Real Interest Rate r 








Inflation Rate (1//7M)  +  — 
Nominal Interest Rate [rlRk-1)  +  + 
Price Level (1//?()  +  — 
Current Account Deficit (£f)  —  + or — 
+ = increases — =  decreases 
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Real Interest Rate (r)  +  +  + 
Inflation Rate (1//?'-1)  +  +  — 
Nominal Interest Rate (A//?'-1)  +  +  + 
Price Level (Mp\)  —  +  — 
Value of Currency 
Relative to Dollar (Me\
k) 
n.a.  - — 
Current Account Deficit (£f)  +  —  + or — 
+ = increases — = decreases n.a. = not applicable 
with the results from Table 2, and all are displayed in 
Table 3. 
The results in Table 3 have an intuitive explanation. 
An increase in /3
1 decreases the amount of money and 
increases the amount of government bonds outstanding in 
the United States. The drop in money produces a lower 
price level and thus a higher real value of government 
bonds. The increase in the supply of real debt in the world 
capital market causes the real interest rate to rise and 
generates the cross-country effects discussed earlier. 
Some of the additional real debt is purchased by foreign 
residents, causing the U.S. current account deficit to rise. 
With more bonds outstanding at a higher real interest 
rate, the real interest expense on government debt rises 
and forces the U. S. government to make greater use of the 
inflation tax. 
Easier U.S. Budget Policy 
With Monetary Accommodation ... 
Now we evaluate an easier budget policy in the United 
States. We increase G
1, the U.S. real budget deficit net-
of-interest, which corresponds to an increase in real 
government consumption, holding constant all s and all 
other G's. The predictions from our model are combined 
with the results from Table 2, and all are displayed in 
Table 4. 
The effects in the United States of an easing in its 
budget policy seem counterintuitive. They are explained 
by the monetary accommodation implied by a fixed /3
1 in 
the face of a higher G
1. At the initial real interest rate, an 
increase in G
1 leaves the demand for government bonds, 
E(r), unaffected. The increase in G
1 affects the supply, 
however, in a way that depends on /3
1. When jS
1 > 0, the 
higher deficit with a fixed implies sufficient monetary 
expansion to reduce the real value of government debt. 
The excess demand for bonds causes the real interest rate 
to fall, and that generates the cross-country effects 
discussed earlier. The monetary accommodation results 
in a higher U.S. price level, and the decline in U.S. 
borrowing causes the U.S. current account deficit to 
shrink. Although the interest expense on U.S. govern-
ment debt falls due to both a lower real stock of bonds and 
a lower real interest rate, the fall does not offset the 
increase in the budget deficit net-of-interest. With a 
higher deficit inclusive of interest, the U.S. government 
must make greater use of the inflation tax. 
... And Without Monetary Accommodation 
Finally, we evaluate an easier budget policy with a non-
accommodating monetary policy in the United States— 
what seems to represent actual U.S. policies in the past 
four years. It is a combination of the previous two experi-
ments, involving an increase in ft
1 and an increase in G
1. 
Since the effects of such increases are often of opposite 
signs, the effects of the combined policy experiment 
cannot simply be deduced from the previous experiments. 
In this experiment we increase G
1 and let the model 
determine the increase in (3
] required to keep the initial 
money stock H\ unchanged from what it otherwise would 
have been. All other /Ts and G's are held constant. To do 
this experiment, we use equation (1) for the first date to 
solve for /3
1 as a function of G
1 and H\9 namely, 
/3
l = (r//?1XG1A1S'1+^) 
where 
= (H\+B\-H\)/H\. 
We next substitute this expression for /V into (19), (20), 
and (21) to get, respectively, 







(26) E(r) = E*2(X*£*-(?*){/?*/[r( 1+0*) - /?*]} 
(27) ^i = A'51(l+0)/(//!+JBl). 
Our policy experiment then translates into determining 
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Table 4 
The Effects of an Easier U.S. Budget Policy 
With Monetary Accommodation 
Other Countries 
United  Debtor Creditor 
States  Government Government 
Variable (01>O)  (/5*>0) (p'< 0) 
Real Interest Rate (r) — 
Inflation Rate (1//?'-1) + 
Nominal Interest Rate (/-//?'-1) + 
Price Level (1 /pfj) + 
Value of Currency 
Relative to Dollar (Me\
k) n.a. 




+ or • 
+ = increases — = decreases  n.a. = not applicable 
the effects in this new system of an increase in G
1 holding 
$ (and hence H\) constant. 
By combining these results with the cross-country 
effects in Table 2, we get the Table 1 results that we 
described in the preview to the paper. As we discussed 
there, these predictions seem generally consistent with 
actual experience. 
These results highlight how the effects of a budget 
policy change depend on the accompanying monetary 
policy. When we hold constant H
l2—rather than p
l as in 
the previous experiment—the effects of an increase in G
1 
seem more in accord with intuition. When H\ is held 
constant, the initial price level is unaffected by the in-
crease in G
1. That increase must then increase the supply 
of real debt in the world capital market, and this causes a 
rise in the real interest rate, which in turn leads to the 
cross-country effects in Table 1. Some of the real debt is 
bought by foreign residents, so that the U.S. current 
account deficit increases. With a higher deficit net-of-
interest and higher interest expense, the United States 
must make greater use of the inflation tax. 
Choosing Monetary Policies: 
Cooperation vs. Noncooperation 
Countries obviously interact in our model, in the sense 
that one country's policy choices affect residents of other 
countries. Here we take all budget policies as given and 
consider whether cooperation among countries in choos-
ing monetary policies, the p
k, would be desirable for the 
world. We address this question by comparing what 
happens if countries cooperate in choosing monetary 
policies with what happens if they do not. 
We make the comparison using the following defini-
tions of not cooperating and cooperating. Not cooperat-
ing will mean that each country k chooses its own mone-
tary policy, p
k, to maximize its social welfare function 
taking as given the monetary policies of all the other 
countries, p
J for all j ^ k.
12 The outcome of non-




K) that simultaneously satisfies these conditions for all 
countries. In the terminology of game theory, such an 
outcome is called a Nash equilibrium. Cooperating will 
mean that all the p
k are chosen to maximize a weighted 
average of the social welfare functions of the individual 
countries. We will show that these definitions and our 
model imply that cooperation is desirable in the sense that 
it can produce a higher value of every country's social 
welfare function than does not cooperating. 
Our first task, then, is to describe the social welfare 
function of a country. Since we are considering only 
stationary equilibria, the country k social welfare function 
can be expressed as a function of three arguments: the 
welfare of a country k initial old person, that of a country 
k saver in any generation, and that of a country k 
borrower in any generation. Moreover, since current old 
persons are better off the higher is p\, since savers are 
better off the higher is r* = \
kR
k
 + (1 —\
k)rf and since 
borrowers are better off the higher is l/rf we can express 
country k's welfare as a function of those three variables, 
namely, as a function u
k(p
kl9
 r* l/r) where u
k is in-
creasing in each of its arguments and is in other respects 
like an ordinary utility function.
1
3 
The next step is to express social welfare for country 
k in terms of the monetary policy parameters, the vector 
P = (P
l, p
2, . . . , p
K). This is done by substituting the 
solutions for p\9 7*, and r that we found earlier into the 
expression for u
k. To do this, we use (22) with the 
argument G suppressed—r = 0(j3)—and express the 
solutions for R










12lf the world has many similar countries, so that each is a small part of the 
world economy, then taking other countries' monetary policies as given is 
approximately the same as taking the world interest rate r as given, as unaffected by 
the choice of p
k. 
13 In particular, we assume that the upper contour sets of u
k are strictly convex. 







Then, recalling that r* = \
kR
K
 + (1 —\
k)r, we let 
(30) I/*(/?*, 
= U
KMP\ WW) + V-\
K)<T>(P\ 1 /0(/3)} 
where = {p\ p\ . . . , p
k~\ p
k+\ . . . , p
K\ 
the vector p with p
k excluded. 
As noted above, we are assuming that what happens 
under noncooperation is described by a Nash equilibrium 
with each country k choosing p
k, taking p
)k{ as given. 












)k{). We can view cooperation as leading to the 






k is the weight given 
to the country k social welfare function and the summa-
tion is over the K countries. 
We appraise the noncooperative solution under the 
assumptions that the world economy consists of identical 
countries and that the noncooperative solution for such a 
world is one with a common value of p




 The assumption of identi-
cal countries simplifies the presentation and does not 




ly, if cooperation is desirable in a world of identical 
countries, then it is desirable in a world of dissimilar 
countries. We then have the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 4. If countries are identical and Assump-
tions 1-4 hold, then monetary policies generally exist 
that imply a higher value of the common social welfare 
function u than is implied by any noncooperative 
solution with a common value of p
k for all k (any 
symmetric Nash equilibrium). 
The proof of this proposition in Appendix C shows 
that a small common departure of all the p
k from their 
common Nash equilibrium value will in general raise the 
value of the common function V, as defined in equation 
(30), from its value at the Nash equilibrium. 
The proof shows, however, that there is no general pre-
sumption about whether the higher value of social welfare 
is achieved at lower or higher values of the p
k (with an 
easier or tighter monetary policy). It implies that if the 
social welfare function does not attach any weight to 
savers (to r*), then better cooperative outcomes are 
achieved at lower values of the p
k. If, alternatively, the 
welfare function does not attach any weight to the initial 
owners of currency (to p\), then better cooperative out-
comes are achieved at higher values of the p
k. These 
results also follow from an examination of the tradeoffs 
among triplets (p
kl9 r*, l/r) faced, on the one hand, by a 
country acting noncooperatively (taking other countries' 
policies as given) and those faced, on the other hand, by 
all countries acting jointly (and varying all the p
k in 
unison). As also shown in Appendix C, a given increase 
in l/r (a benefit to borrowers) is achieved at the expense 
of a larger decrease in/?* (a cost to the initial old) when a 
country acts noncooperatively than when all countries act 
jointly. And a given increase in l/r is achieved at the 
expense of a smaller decrease in r* (a cost to savers) when 
a country acts noncooperatively than when all countries 
act jointly. Obviously, then, if the social welfare function 
attaches weight to the well-being of all three groups, then 
the better cooperative outcomes can occur at either lower 
or higher common values of the p
k. The following two 
examples illustrate these possibilities. 
The examples are of a world economy with three 
identical countries. In each country, each generation 
consists of one saver endowed with 1 unit of the consump-
tion good when young and nothing when old and one 
borrower endowed with nothing when young and 1.05 
units of the consumption good when old. Each person has 
a utility function equal to the sum of the logarithms of 
first- and second-period consumption. These assump-
tions imply S
k = 0.5 and D
k(r) = 1.05/2r for all k. We 
also assume that X* = 0.1 and G
k = 0.005 for all L 
Finally, we let u
k(p
k,
 r* l/r) = (0.01) In (p
k) + 
a In (r*) 4- In (l/r), where a is a parameter.
1
6
 If a = 1, 
then the symmetric Nash equilibrium values are 
(P'.rftT*, l/r) = (-0.267, 0.0341, 1.118, 1/1.139) 
and, as can easily be verified, better outcomes are 
We do not prove existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. It is easy to 
make assumptions about V which guarantee such existence—namely, that for each 
possible common value for monetary policy chosen by other countries, country k 
has a unique best policy which is neither indefinitely easy (in the direction of — 1) 
nor indefinitely tight (in the direction of
00) and which depends in a continuous way 
on the policy chosen by other countries. However, it is hard to make appealing 
assumptions about the structure and the social welfare function u




 The assumption of identical countries in our model does have one special 
consequence. It implies that a symmetric cooperative optimum is achieved if each 
country both imposes capital controls which rule out any international borrowing 
and lending and chooses its monetary policy, its /?, to maximize its social welfare 
function. 
16Note that this particular u
k is actually a weighted sum of indirect utilities, 
since (aside from additive constants) the indirect utility function of the initial old 
person who holds the initial nominal debt of country A: is In (/T^ ), that of the country 
k saver in each generation is In (/*), and that of any borrower is In (l/r). 
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achieved at (slightly) lower values of the If a = 2, then 
the symmetric Nash equilibrium values are 
(P\ p
kl9 J*, Mr) = (0.558,0.0638,1.178,1/1.217) 




Perusal of Appendix C will verify that cooperation is 
desirable in this model because of the asymmetry dis-
cussed in the preview. One country's policy affects its 
borrowers and those of other countries in the same way, 
but affects its initial old and its savers in a quite different 
way than it affects the initial old and savers of other 




 Since the asymmetry is more important the 
smaller is each country relative to the world economy, the 
desirability of cooperation in our model does not depend 
on countries being, in any sense, large relative to the 
world economy. 
•Different noncooperative equilibrium concepts— 
for example, ones that do not treat the countries 
symmetrically and ones that have countries take into 
account the policy responses of other countries. 
•Different cooperative equilibrium concepts—for 
example, ones that take account of enforcement 
problems arising from uncertainty. 
We do not know how these departures would change the 
form that desirable cooperation would take. 
Thus, although we have identified one set of general 
conditions about the world's markets in currencies and 
securities that imply some role for cooperation, our 
analysis does not imply a particular way of achieving 
desirable cooperation. It does suggest that there is a 
plausible rationale for the proposal that countries coordi-
nate their macroeconomic policies under floating ex-
change rates. However, it leaves quite open what precise 
form that coordination should take. 
Conclusion 
We have shown that in a particular model some form of 
coordination would improve the workings of a floating 
exchange rate system. We have identified crucial features 
of our model as separate country-by-country markets in 
currencies and an integrated world market in securities in 
which government borrowing affects interest rates. We 
have also suggested that our conclusion is likely to hold in 
most models that share these features. However, even if 
these features are accepted as approximating conditions 
in the actual world economy, our conclusion cannot be 
taken as recommending a particular policy. 
Within the confines of our particular model, we have 
seen that no general conclusion emerges concerning 
whether better cooperative outcomes are achieved at 
tighter or easier monetary policies. How cooperation 
changes policies depends on the objective tradeoffs as 
well as on the weights each country assigns the utilities of 
different groups of people. 
Since features within our model affect the form that 
desirable cooperation takes, we expect that departures 
from our model would also affect it. We can imagine 
reasonable departures in several directions: 
•Different economic environments—for example, 
environments with more general asset demands, un-
certainty, and nontraded goods. 
•Differentpolicy choices—for example, nonconstant 
sequences of policies and policies parameterized in 
different ways. 
17For the above form of D
k(r), equation (20) is quadratic in r at a common 
value of p. This permits us to find an explicit form for the function V and for its 
partial derivative with respect to its first argument. For each example, the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium was found by numerically solving for the common 
value of the (ft for which that partial derivative is zero. 
ISThe asymmetry and, we strongly suspect, the desirability of cooperation 
would not be present if all the initial old and all the savers held all the different 
currencies in the same proportion. The kind of asymmetry we find is implied as 
long as the currency of country k is held predominantly by its residents. 
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Proofs of Propositions 1-3 
PROPOSITION 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, any stationary 
equilibrium has r > 1 and is a binding equilibrium. 
Proof. By (13) and/?*> —l,h
k + b
k>0. But then, by (10) and 
Assumption 2, r > 1. To see that a nonbinding stationary 
equilibrium cannot exist, note that/?* = r > 1 and h
k + b
k > 0 
imply that the right side of (9) is negative, which contradicts 
Assumption 1. 
PROPOSITION 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, a binding equilibrium 
with r < r exists. 
Proof. We will show that equation (20) has a solution with 
r e (1, r). That and Assumption 1 will imply immediately that 
the right side of (19) is positive and less than unity (0 < R
k < r) 
and that the right side of (21) is positive (p\ > 0). 
SinceE(r) andF(r; p, G) are continuous functions of r (for 
fixed p and G), to show that (20) has a solution with r e (1, r) 
we need only show that£(l) < F(l; p, G) and that E(r) > 
F(r; p, G). 






the inequality being a consequence of Assumption 2. We also 














 both inequalities being consequences of Assumption 
1. Thus, E(l)<F(l; P, G). 
Since F(r, p, G) is increasing in p
k for each k, F(r, p, G) is 




 for every k. This limit 
is [Z*(\*S*-G*)]/(r-l). Therefore, Assumption 3 implies 
that E(r) > F(r; p, G). 
PROPOSITION3. Under Assumptions 1-3 and either Assumption 
4 or the existence of an equilibrium with F(r; p, G) > 0, 
equation (20) has a unique solution with r < r. 
Proof. Since Proposition 3 is obviously true if p
k = 0 for all k, we 
proceed under the assumption that p
k ^ 0 for at least some k. 
Letting/(r) = F(r; p, G), we first establish that 
(Al) f'(r) < —(\/r)/[r). 








k] and yk(r) = l/[r - p
k/( 1 +£*)]. 
We also have that if p
k > 0, then xk(r) > 0 andyk{r) > l/r, 
while if p
k < 0, then xk(r) < 0 and yk(r) < l/r. Therefore, 
-f'(r) = Xxk(r)yk(r) > (l/r)Zxk(r) = (1 /r]f{r). Thus, 
we have (Al). 
Inequality (Al) says that J[r) [which is identical to 
F(r; p, G)] is downward-sloping wherever F is not negative. 
Thus, if (20) has a solution where/> 0—say, at r+—then it is 
the only solution. There cannot be a solution at r > r+ because 
E(r) is increasing and f can never get to a higher value than/(r+) 
without violating (Al). There cannot be a solution with r< r+ 
because then/could never get to a value as great as/(r+) with-
out violating (A1). [Note that we get an equilibrium where F> 0 
if enough of the p
k are positive. Thus, if p
k > 0 for all k, then we 
have a unique solution to (20) without appeal to Assumption 4.] 
When there is no solution with F> 0, we need Assumption 
4. Since £(1) < F(l; p, G) =J{ 1), uniqueness is implied if 
f(r) < E'(r) at any solution. 
At any solution, we have the following string: 




 + (1 /r)D(r) 
< ~(l/r) Z( 1 -\
k)S
k
 -D'(r) < ~D'(r) = E'(r). 
The first inequality is (Al); the second (an equality) uses the 
assumption that we are at a solution; the third (an equality) uses 
the definition ofE(r); the fourth uses Assumption 4 and the fact 
that D(r) > 0 at any r< r. 
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Appendix B 
Expressions for the Effects 
of One Country's Policy Changes 
Here we display expressions for the derivatives of key variables 
with respect to the real interest rate in a passive country and with 
respect to policy variables in the own-country. 
Effects of a Change in the Real Interest Rate 
on Passive Country k 















(B3)  -xkPkd+Pk)  (21) 
(B4)  Ck:  D
k(r) - xkPk(l+Pk) 
(20), (24) 
Effects of a Change in Country 1 's Monetary Policy 
Derivative with respect to /S
1 of  From 
(B5)  r:  X






(B7)  R>/r:  -(x'/X'S'Mlx'Kl+^'Vao] + (r-1)}  (19), (20) 




JPXI+P) ~ D\r)] /(l+p
l)[r(l+p
l)
 - fi 
+ XlPl/[r(l+Pk)~
 P"])  (21), (B3), (B8) 





*a0 = Ef=1 x* /?*(!+/?*) - D'(r) > 0 by Assumptions 1-4. 
29 Effects of a Change in Country 1 's Budget Policy 
With Monetary Accommodation 
Derivative with respect to G
l (with fixed ft
1) of From 
(Bll)  r:  (—l/doM
1 /[r(l+ p1) ~ P1])  (20) 
(B12)  R
l: 
aA-mo + x'iP1)2]*  (19), (20) 
(B13)  R
l/r:  ail-a 0 + XlPV+P1)]  (19), (20) 




(B15)  ei,k. 
~(e\*/a0)(mi+PV[W +P1) ~ PW+Pk) ~ PkW 
(21), (B3), (B14) 
(B16)  C|:  -{p/[r(\+p
l)-pi]\{I,
Kk=2








Effects of a Change in Country 1 's Budget Policy 
Without Monetary Accommodation 
Derivative with respect to G
!(with fixed H\) of From 
(B17)  r:  l/{a0-XlP
l(l+P1)]  (26) 
(B18)  R
l: 
(-l/X'Si)({(\i5^+Gi)/[a0 - XlPV+P1)]) + r)  (25) 
(B19)  R1 /r:  -[(\+<l>)/r2]/[a0-xl PHl+P1)]  (25) 





 ~ XlPlV+P1)]  (21), (B3), (B20) 
(B22)  C j:  [xkPk(l+Pk)-DX(r)]} 
- {2*=1 fcW+P*) " D«(r)] ~ Di'(r)} (24), (26) 
*al = {\lSl[r(l\-pl)-pl]a0}~1
 > 0. 
a2 = [(l+pl)\lSl]al
 >0. 
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Appendix C 
Proof of Proposition 4 and 
Derivation of the Model's Tradeoffs 
Proof of Proposition 4 
PROPOSITION 4. If countries are identical and Assumptions 1-4 
hold, then monetary policies generally exist that imply a higher 
value of the common social welfare function u than is implied 
by any noncooperative solution with a common value of p
kfor 
all k (any symmetric Nash equilibrium). 
Proof Let lK-x denote a K — 1 element vector of l's, and let 
V\( •, •) denote the partial derivative of V with respect to its first 
argument. We show that the derivative of V[p, P(lK-x)] with 
respect to p is generally different from zero when it is evaluated 
at a symmetric Nash equilibrium, p, which satisfies the first-
order condition Vx[ft P(lK-\)]
 = 
Since DV\P,P^K-X)VDP = VI[P,P(IK-I)] + {(*-L) X 
V)([P, P(lK-\)]}, where V){ denotes the partial derivative 
of V with respect to any argument other than the first, and since 
V\[P, P(IK-\)]
 = 0, our task is to derive an expression for 
V)([pf p(lK-\)] and evaluate it at p = p. 
From (30), 
(CI) Kx[ft«lJf-1)] = iiiO0^i9O + u2X(d<f>
k/dft) 
+ [(1 -\)u2 - (u3/r*)](d<f>/dft) 
(C2) VMPilK-O^utftf/dP) + u2\(d<t>
k/dp*) 
-f [(l~\)u2 - (u3/r
2)](d<f>/dp
k) 
where ul stands for the partial derivative of u with respect to its 
zth argument and where the partial derivatives of 0, 0^, and 
0f—see equations (22), (28), and (29)—are computed as in 
Appendix B. 
At a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the right side of (C2) is 
zero and d<p/dp
k = d<f>/dft. These imply, by substitution from 
(C2) into (CI), that 















 = R(r-l)/[r(l+P) - fi] 
we have 
(C6) VM(1k-I)] = -V&IKl+« " P] 1 
X [UlS - u2(r-l)]. 
Although the terms in the second factor on the right side of 
(C6)—that involving ux and u2—have opposite signs, they are 
generally not of equal magnitudes. Thus, F)([/3, p(lK-{)] is 
generally not zero. 
Cooperative and Noncooperative Tradeoffs 
Write (19) as R
k = g(p
k, r) and (21) as p\ = h(P
k9 r). Also, 
let dr/dp
k = dc/>(p)/dp
k and dr/dp = Xkd<t>(p)/dp
k. If these 
derivatives are evaluated at p
k = p for all k, then dr/dp = 
Kdr/dp
k, which is used below. 




 = gx+ g2(dr/dp
k) 








k) + g2 








= gl/(dr/dp) + g2 





k/dr)N = -(K-\)gl/(dr/dp) > 0 
since dr/dp





Then, since r* = \R
k + (1 — X)r, we know immediately that 
(dr
k/dr)c ~ (df^/dr^ is X times the right side of (CI 1). 




 -{K~\)hx/{dr/dp) < 0. 





 > 0 [see (21)]. 
To get the corresponding tradeoffs between r* and Mr and 
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